



Irregular migration from a global perspective
The occurrence of irregular immigration has been
reported in numerous countries of the world. It is a
global phenomenon and exists in the US and in the
EU, in Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Jordan, Singapore,
South Korea, Malaysia, South Africa, Botswana,
Morocco, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica.
Indeed, irregular immigration is not limited to high-
income countries but also found in middle and low
income countries. Globally, in 2002, there were an
estimated 22–44 million irregular immigrants (IM;
Düvell 2006).This estimate does not claim any accu-
racy but at least indicates the scale of the phenome-
non.Thus, around 10–20 percent of all international
migrants,214 million in 2010,could be in an irregular
position; still only a mere 0.6 or so percent of the
global population. In the US, the stock of IMs is
around 11 million (2009), an increase from 6.1 mil-
lion in 1998 or 9.4 million in 2002 (Koslowski 2011).
In the EU-27 there are 1.9–3.8 million IMs (2008), a
significant decrease from an esti-
mated 3.1–5.3 million in 2002
(only EU-12;Vogel 2009) and sig-
nificantly lower than previously
commonly assumed. Most of the
irregular resident population is
estimated to live in the old west-
ern and southern member states,
notably Germany, Spain, France
and the UK. In Russia the level
of IMs is estimated at 4 million
irregular immigrants, a significant
drop due to a major de-facto reg-
ularisation in 2008 (Moscow News
2009), and in South Africa there
are at least one million, some say up to five million
IMs,1 though a decrease has been noted due to a reg-
ularisation of Zimbabweans in 2010 (e.g. Migration
News 2010). This implies that more than half of all
IMs reside and work in the US, EU, Russia and
South Africa.A comparison of the EU and US shows
that in the EU the stock of IMs is 0.39–0.77 percent
of the total population (1.9–3.8 million of 499 million)
whilst apprehended clandestine entrants represent
only 0.021 percent of all international arrivals
(714 million). In the US the stock of IMs is 3.6 per-
cent of total population (11 million of 305 million)
whilst 445,000 apprehensions on the south-western
border (in 2010;GAO 2011) represent 0.1 percent of
all international arrivals (400 million).2 Thus, com-
pared to the US levels of IMs in the EU are rela-
tively low; indeed, it is so small that it is hardly pos-
sibly to present irregular migration in the EU in any
graphical form (Figure).
In terms of flows, it is assumed that in the EU 80–90
percent of all IMs have entered regularly (Düvell
2011a), hence on a visa and then overstayed, whilst
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1This would represent 12 percent of the total population and seems
implausibly high.
2 In 2009, 541,000 arrests were made on the US-Mexican border
(Burke 2010).Apprehensions at the northern US-Canadian border
were only around 6,000 annually, 1.3 percent of the level on the
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in the US 60–70 percent has entered clandestinely
(Koslowski 2011). Indeed, the decrease in the stock
of IMs in the EU is due to accession of several major
sending countries (e.g., Poland, Lithuania in 2004
and Romania in 2007), large scale regularisation
which since 1996 affected around four million people
(Baldwin-Edward and Kraler 2009), enhanced bor-
der and internal controls, and the impact of the eco-
nomic crisis on migration in general. In contrast, the
increase of IMs in the US is due to weak internal
controls, notably lack of work place inspections and
the decision not to regularise IMs. The majority of
IMs usually comes from other countries in the re-
gion,Mexicans in the US,East Europeans and North
Africans in Europe, CIS citizens in Russia or Zim-
babweans in South Africa, though significant pro-
portions come from more distant countries. Usually,
irregular migration is mixed migration,meaning that
it is composed of labour migrants, refugees, family
members and other types, and each type raises spe-
cific economic and political concerns.
How politics and economics facilitate irregular
immigration
Principally,a distinction has to be made between eco-
nomic and political “push-and-pull” factors, or
between economic and political reasons to migrate,
though both are not easy to separate.Irregular labour
migration is driven by asymmetries between the
demand for labour and the supply, that is a tension
between economics and politics,meaning that politics
– for various more or less rational reasons – prevents
businesses from regularly hiring the workers they
need. Indeed, in the advanced economies and main
destination countries,US and EU,labour migration is
now severely restricted and the largest proportion of
immigrants come through the family reunification
channel (e.g.,Hanson 2007;Kraler and Kofman 2009)
followed by students and refugees. In particular im-
practical, cumbersome and time-consuming work
permit applications that increase the costs and delay
or prevent hiring workers result in industries turning
to irregular practices (Düvell 2011a). Thus, labour
migration, except some sought-after professions,
notably the highly-skilled,are pushed towards irregu-
lar migration channels. The main problem lies in the
availability of low-skilled and accordingly low paid
workers, because (a) indigenous workers are increas-
ingly well educated whilst (b) the indigenous low-
skilled, often cushioned by welfare incomes, refuse
the low-paid jobs available.
The economic “push” factors behind irregular migra-
tion are for the most part identical to those affecting
regular migration:unemployment,low income,dissat-
isfying working conditions or lack of career opportu-
nities. Some of the “pull” factors of regular and irreg-
ular migration, however, differ. First, irregular migra-
tion is more often driven by network effects; this is
because irregular immigrants more often need sup-
port from other migrants already in the country to
find jobs and accommodation (Düvell 2006). Second,
countries with deregulated economies and large
informal sectors, such as Italy or Turkey, offer more
opportunities to irregular immigrants than highly reg-
ulated countries, such as Sweden. Hence, irregular
immigrants are more likely to be attracted to coun-
tries which are more adverse to state intervention
(US) and more tolerant to irregular employment (for
example, Greece; e.g. Baldwin-Edwards 1998).
Furthermore, irregular migration is also shaped by
the way labour markets are gendered. This means
that in certain countries there is a demand for care
workers, which typically attract female IMs. Other
countries need construction workers, which typically
attract male IMs. This explains why, for instance,
male irregular migrant workers from Ukraine prefer
going to Russia whilst female Ukrainian IMs rather
going to Italy.
Similar processes not only drive the dispersal of
irregular immigrants within a country but also across
the economy. Irregular immigrants are attracted to
areas,sectors or businesses that are less controlled or
regulated, such as multi-ethnic cities and the coun-
tryside or small businesses and the domestic sector,
where they are less visible. For example, irregular
migration was once prominent in the German con-
struction sector but due to increased workplace raids
IMs were pushed out. As a result they moved from
large companies into private renovations. Likewise,
where employment in workplaces is inspected, IMs
generally move into self-employment, e.g., as clean-
ers or builders (Düvell 2006).
Some political economists suggest that governments
deliberately or as a side-effect of certain policies cre-
ate a gap between migration policy goals aimed at
preventing irregular migration and implementation
practice, such as a lack of enforcement officers, that
provide the preconditions for irregular migration
(Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994).Another ra-
tionale for accepting some level of undocumented
migration lies in the political economy of internaland external controls: i.e., there is a turning point
when perfect control becomes exorbitantly expen-
sive and uneconomical compared with the assumed
gains (Jahn and Straubhaar 1998; Hanson 2007).
Determinants of irregular migration3
Principally,irregular migration is a legal and political
construct, meaning, that what is irregular is defined
by politics and the law, and thus can be politically
deconstructed, i.e., reversed. There are five aspects
that determine an immigration status:exit,entry,res-
idence, employment and birth. Each aspect can be
regular or irregular and various combinations are
possible, for example:
• Either an individual has irregularly and without
authorisation crossed the border of a nation state
and is or is not working;
• Or an individual who has regularly stayed in a
given country fails to depart before the time limit
set in his or her visa, overstays and is or is not
working;
• Or an individual who is regularly staying in a
given country is taking up employment in breach
of visa regulations and is thereby jeopardising
his/her immigration status;
• Or a person is born to irregular immigrant par-
ents and becomes an irregular immigrant by birth
even without ever having crossed an internation-
al border.
• Finally, in some countries irregular exit is an of-
fence and can be persecuted (e.g.,China,Sri Lanka
and increasingly in Morocco, Senegal and Algeria).
Based on the above,the Table emerges (Düvell 2008).
For instance, irregular entry/regular residence could
apply to a refugee who clandestinely entered a coun-
try but then applies for asylum and thus regularises
his or her status; irregular entry/irregular residence/
regular employment was a pattern found in the
Netherlands before 1998 prior to the Linkage act;4
and regular entry/regular residence/irregular em-
ployment refers to tourist visa holders working in
breach of the visa conditions.
Because of complex legal conditions the immigra-
tion status often is anything but clear. For instance,
foreign students who,in addition to their studies,also
engage in employment and exceed certain hourly
limits, e.g., 20 hours a week as in the UK, could be
considered violating the terms of their visa and thus
be qualified as irregular immigrants. The 20-hour
threshold, however, is arbitrary and difficult to con-
trol. Other cases refer to work permit holders who
work in a job other than that stated in their permit,
thus they have a regular residence and work permit
but violate one condition of their visa. In certain
countries, as in Spain, clandestine immigrants can
even register with local authorities and thus partly
regularise their situation but would still be consid-
ered irregular by the police.These examples (Düvell
2008) demonstrate that the extent of irregularity can
vary considerably and depends on the extent the
threshold is violated.In practice there will often be a
gap between the legal threshold and a tolerated
deviation from this norm – underpinned by process-
es of prioritising the scarce resources of the enforce-
ment service (Düvell and Jordan 2003).
In addition, immigration status can be subject to
change.For instance,migrants arrive and stay legally
but then overstay and thus lose their status, or they
arrive irregularly and then regularise their status,
e.g., with an asylum application, marriage or an am-
nesty. Finally, irregular migrants from more distant
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Source: Compilation of the author.
3 No less than six different terms are applied,clandestine,irregular,
unlawful, undocumented, unauthorised and irregular migration.
Also other concepts such as bogus asylum seekers, economic
refugees or transit migration have become codes for irregular
migration. There are problems with all the terms but irregular
immigration seems to be the broadest and least ideologically
loaded and thus most appropriate to reflect the diversity of this
phenomenon (Düvell 2006).
4 The Linkage Act establishes a link between immigrants’ right of
residence and the services provided by the government.CESifo DICE Report 3/2011 63
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countries do not necessarily stay in the first country
of their arrival but move on to other destinations,for
instance, within the EU from Spain to France, from
non-EU countries,such as Turkey to the EU or from
Guatemala through Mexico to the US. Thus, some
irregular migrants are rather mobile, and irregular
migration is often only transitional.
Irregularity also depends on law enforcement prac-
tices. For example, migrants might violate certain
immigration regulations and pursue unlawful strate-
gies whilst on the other hand this might not be a
secret but known to authorities or other members of
the public. For instance, employers or landlords are
often well aware of an immigrant’s lack of permis-
sion to work or residence but nevertheless do not
report such an individual but employ or rent out to
such persons. There are often many other members
of the host society who support, tolerate or at least
ignore and thus do not report IMs,because the moral
of the community differs from the law (Düvell 2007).
Also in many countries the police either prioritises
more serious forms of law violations and does not
specifically target suspected IMs or the police would
accept bribes from IMs in exchange for not arresting
them,notably in non-EU countries.After all,IMs are
often well-aware of law enforcement practices and
avoid certain public places, certain actions, like rid-
ing without a bus fare, or working in sites or sectors
that are targeted by the police.
Finally, it matters whether or not deportation is
actually enforceable or whether due to unknown
nationality and/or identity, lack of documents, hu-
manitarian objections or simple lack of resources
an IM is de facto not deportable. Thus it is often
the case that an immigrant is irregular but cannot
be deported and is de facto tolerated. Hundreds of
thousands of IMs in the EU and US fall into this
category.The legal issue arising from this situation
is whether IMs who are not deportable should be
served with some kind of a status, as, for instance,
the EU’s Return Directive suggests (Council of the
European Union 2008a).
The argument made here is, first, that “irregulari-
ty”is anything but a clear-cut category and,second,
that very few migrants live an “underground life”.
Instead, irregular immigrants generally live in the
midst of our societies but are almost unrecognis-
able.The majority of clandestine immigrants seems
to live relatively normal, even “quasi-regular” lives
(Düvell 2006, 180).
Irregular immigrants and the economy
Irregular migration affects the production,consump-
tion and fiscal outcome of receiving countries, even
when migrants are not active on the labour market.
All this, however, occurs only on a small scale ac-
cording to the relatively small number of IMs.Often,
it is the alleged negative aspects of irregular migra-
tion that raise most attention such as unfair labour
competition; driving down wages or displacing in-
digenous workers; undermining power relations
between organised workers (trade unions) and em-
ployers;tax evasion;illegitimate claims for social ser-
vices or supposed congestion of the housing market;
undermining rule of law;or exploitation and the emer-
gence of criminal milieus (e.g., Jahn and Straubhaar
1998; Hanson 2007). But what seems plausible at first
glance is often not so; indeed, a closer look reveals
that how the costs and benefits of irregular migration
are distributed is not obvious and the situation is
more mixed than generally assumed.
First of all, irregular immigrants represent either
scarce or inexpensive and flexible labour.Whilst reg-
ular immigrants are often “subject to arbitrary selec-
tion criteria and bureaucratic delays, which tend to
disassociate legal inflows from labour-market condi-
tions”, irregular immigrants “tend to arrive in larger
numbers when the economy is booming and move to
regions where job growth is strong” (Hanson 2007,
5). Irregular migration, as any migration, principally
contributes to economics of scale, larger domestic
markets, higher gross domestic product, and an en-
riched and more dynamic environment.Irregular im-
migrants even contribute to the fiscal system; some-
times they pay direct taxes, notably when they work
on borrowed national insurance numbers, and off
course indirect taxes, such as VAT.
There is little evidence that irregular migration dri-
ves down wages or even substitutes indigenous
workers, instead migration generally “play[s] a com-
plementary role” (OECD 1990, 85; see also Hazari
and Sgro 2003). An EU study has come to the con-
clusion that “at first sight,high unemployment seems
to contradict high (irregular) immigration.However,
an analysis of the Italian labour market shows that
few Italians are in real competition with migrant
workers”(European Communities 2000,53).Indeed,
the substitution effect of migration has only been
observed in agriculture (Venturini 1999). Green-
house (2000) argues that in the US the impact of
migration on indigenous wages is marginal and onlynon-skilled labour is affected. In particular IMs, be-
cause of differing human and cultural capital, e.g.,
lack of language proficiency, are more likely to face
disadvantages when they compete directly with
native workers. Indeed, because they are excluded
from the formal labour market they are put in a posi-
tion where they are denied the preconditions for fair
competition.
Instead of competing with indigenous work forces,
specific patterns of the interaction between migrants
and markets have been identified. In particular IMs
traditionally occupy labour market segments that
are rejected or for other reasons not filled by indige-
nous workers (Iglitzka, Gmay and Maroukis 2011).
Irregular migrant labour encourages a further divi-
sion of labour into its more and less productive ele-
ments. For example, the bricklayer’s work is divided
into bricklaying by a skilled British worker and han-
dling the bricks by an unskilled irregular immigrant
(Jordan and Düvell 2002). In the process the pro-
ductivity of skilled native workers is raised.IMs even
create new markets for jobs and allow indigenous
populations to enter the labour market (Young 1999).
For instance, it is only because IMs offer cheap la-
bour that lower-income households can afford to
hire, for instance, domestic workers. As a result, a
market is created for low-paid domestic work which
did not previously exist. Second, this frees indige-
nous women from the constraints of housework and
allows them to (re-)enter the labour market, which
raises their productivity. Third, the household in-
come increases and thus their overall spending
power. Fourth, because previously non-working in-
digenous populations enter employment they pay
taxes and thus raise state revenues. Fifth, low-wage
workers enable firms to offer lower-priced goods
and services, which have a diminishing impact on
inflation. A cycle is thereby generated which posi-
tively affects large numbers of households, the state
budget and even the economy at large.
IMs are typically concentrated in sectors and indus-
tries which cannot be outsourced to low-wage coun-
tries, such as agriculture and food processing, con-
struction or some segments of the textile industry
(which require greater proximity to markets because
of fast-changing fashions and demands), domestic
and care work, tourism (hotel and restaurant), ser-
vice sector, not to forget prostitution. Instead, low-
wage labour in form of IMs is taken in (Düvell 2006).
In the US and many other countries irregular
migrant labour is a prerequisite for the survival of
businesses which otherwise would not be able to
compete with cheap imports (Wall Street Journal
2004). Hence, irregular immigration is an alternative
to closing down or outsourcing and thus helps to
maintain industries and protect indigenous jobs.
It has been demonstrated that immigration pathway
and status determines immigrants’ wages meaning
that irregular entrants receive the lowest, overstay-
ers a higher and regular immigrants the highest
wages (Rivera-Batiz 2001).This often correlates with
some ethnic stratification where certain groups are
to be found at the bottom of the scale (Psimmenos
and Kassimati 2006). However, half of the wage gap
between regular and irregular migrants is actually
due to differing characteristics, such as age, gender,
education, language proficiency etc., and only the
other half can be interpreted as discrimination
against undocumented migrant workers (Rivera-
Batiz 1999). Meanwhile, trade unions in the EU and
US have begun to recruit and represent irregular
immigrants, which potentially neutralises some of
the critical aspects of irregular migration.
Finally, in many countries irregular immigrants have
no or only limited access to public services and, by
and large, avoid any interaction with statutory agen-
cies;therefore,often there is almost no negative wel-
fare aspect (Düvell 2006). Rather the opposite is
true:they may work on borrowed national insurance
numbers and thus contribute but are exempted from
accessing social services.
To sum up, an OECD report (1989, 20) once inter-
preted “unauthorised immigration” as a “labour mar-
ket adjustment to economic trends”. In Greece
(Sarris and Zografakis 1999) and the US (Hanson
2007) it was observed that irregular immigration has
overall positive effects on the economy.Thus,Boswell
and Straubhaar (2003,1) suggest that there is an “eco-
nomically optimal level of irregular migration”.
Irregular migration and the EU political response
Irregular immigration is considered one of the “key
threats” to the EU (Council of the European Union
2003,4).The prevention of irregular immigration has
become a top priority in the EU’s “global approach”
to migration (Council of the European Union 2005)
and the European Security Strategy (e.g., Council of
the European Union 2008b). As early as 1974 the
then European Economic Community began to re-
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spond as a political entity to irregular migration, but
only issued its first policy in 1985.In 1989,the Coun-
cil of the European Community in its famous “Palma
declaration” defined the principle doctrine of EU
migration policies as internal,free movement requir-
ing tough immigration and external border controls.
Thus, over the past 25 years, numerous policies have
been designed to improve border security and tack-
le irregular immigration. Indeed, the latter has been
a crucial driver of Europeanisation in the field of
migration policies (Düvell 2011b).
Notably the Tampere presidency conclusions intro-
duced a “coherent approach”along four lines (Euro-
pean Commission 2000):
1. tackling irregular immigration at its source,
2. introduce consistent control of external borders
to stop irregular immigration,
3. combating those who engage in trafficking in
human beings and economic exploitation of
migrants, and
4. detect and dismantle relevant criminal networks.
This was translated into two sets of internal and ex-
ternal policies, (a) a common immigration and bor-
der control code, coordinated and joint border con-
trols,common visa procedures,carrier sanctions,com-
mon detention and return standards, coordinated
deportations and employer sanctions, and (b) read-
mission agreements, deployment of officers, con-
trolling borders and capacity building of border and
immigration controls, and generally linking im-
migration control with development aid, reconstruc-
tion, trade or technical cooperation agreements in/
with non-member states as well as collaboration with
private businesses and intergovernmental actors
(carriers, IOM, ICMPD).
The main external immigration law enforcement
measure is border controls, both on border crossing
points and along the green and blue borders. In the
EU there are 400,000 border guards, in the US there
are 41,000 Customs and Border Protection officers
(Koslowski 2011). Enhanced border patrols, howev-
er,have two partly paradoxical effects.First,they are
responded to by the emergence of irregular service
providers (“smugglers”), ever more sophisticated
smuggling operations, which then increase in price,
and constantly changing paths (UNDOC 2009).And
second, more and better controls increase the costs
of irregular border crossings and compel people,
once in the country to stay longer, thus the stock of
IMs actually increases (Massey 2002).
The main internal immigration law enforcement
measures are (1) random ID controls on streets/train
stations/trains, (2) routine workplace inspections,
(3) reporting obligations or denunciation practices,
(4) routine police inspections of public places,(5) one-
off high profile raids and (6) arrests of suspects at
hospitals, schools or NGOs (in that order of im-
portance).IMs,however,as implied above,are aware
of these strategies and avoid, as far as possible such
measures.Thus, their impact is limited.
Significant resources are spent on these national and
EU policies. The EU Framework programme (FP)
Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows
(2007–13) alone is worth EUR 5.8 billion. For in-
stance, EUR 62 million are spent on setting up re-
fugee reception and removal centres in Turkey.And
Germany spends EUR 386 million (2006) on labour
market inspections, 3 percent of all businesses,
though mostly targeting indigenous people working
off the books (Vogel and Cyrus 2008, 6).
So far, the EU has drawn various actors into its pol-
icy framework and expanded its scope of activities
well beyond its territory; this has subsequently re-
sulted in a transformation of the conventional con-
cept of nation states (Düvell and Vollmer 2011).
These policies, projects and institutions remain di-
verse, changeable and occasionally controversial.
Sometimes they are short-living (notably projects,
also the risk analysis centres), partly overlapping
(Frontex, EUBAM, and CIREFI, and the Budapest
and Söderköping processes) or criticised for their
adverse impact on human rights (e.g., the readmis-
sion agreement with Libya, funding detention cen-
tres in Ukraine or certain Frontex operations).
Conclusion
Irregular migration has become a significant struc-
tural phenomenon at the end of the 20th century.
There appears to be a strange and unintended rela-
tion between migration, restrictions, continuing
migration and its irregularisation, as the restrictions,
instead of having a deterrent effect, are more likely
to provoke migrants to dive deeper into invisible ac-
tivities and stay longer (Düvell 2006; Koslowski
2011).In the EU,the relevance of border controls for
containing irregular migration is often exaggerated
because most IMs arrive regularly and then overstay.
Also the number of irregular immigrants is usually
assumed to be much higher than it is in reality andthus probably disproportionate attention is paid to
irregular migration.Due to the overall small number
of irregular immigrants their impact on the economy
is modest though significant in the few sectors where
they concentrate, such as domestic work and clean-
ing, hotel and catering, agriculture and construction.
Irregular immigrants are often individualist and en-
trepreneurial (Düvell 2006); they are highly respon-
sive to labour market needs and more geograph-
ically mobile than the indigenous population (Han-
son 2007). They are also more adaptable to less fa-
vourable working and living conditions. Finally, be-
cause they send home remittances that enable other
family members to stay, irregular immigrants para-
doxically even contribute to containing further irreg-
ular migration.5
European policy responses have been driven as
much if not more by perceptions,discourses and po-
litical principles as by knowledge. Considering the
relatively low level of irregular migration and the
mixed and often rather positive economic and even
fiscal effects the high level of political attention and
deployment of resources in the EU, the US and
elsewhere could be considered almost dispropor-
tionate. In any case, the presence of irregular immi-
grants, whether they are working or not, raises ques-
tions of access to fundamental human rights,wheth-
er this be access to health care, education or legal
remedies. Thus, a laisser fair or toleration policy is
in the long term rather problematic, instead some
form of re-regularisation is probably more benefi-
cial to all stakeholders.
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